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Imagining St. Benedict in Greenwich Village: 
Vocational Fragility and The Culture of  Authenticity 
Robert Di  Pede 
  
 When we think of monks and nuns, i.e., those whom we call by the title Sister and Brother – we are 
often referring to a category of men and women, predominantly in the Catholic Church, who according to 
an ancient tradition have dedicated themselves to God by publicly professing vows.  The vows are famil-
iarly (not necessarily) three: poverty, chastity, and obedience.  In the Catholic tradition the manner of life 
that comes with the public profession of these vows is called Consecrated life or Religious life, and its 
most familiar institutional form is Religious Orders.  The members of Religious Orders are commonly re-
ferred to as Religious, and Religious may be distinguished according to specific affiliations: Benedictines 
(abbreviated: OSB), Dominicans (OP), Franciscans (OFM), Jesuits (SJ), and Salesians (SDB), to name but a 
few prominent exemplars.  One of the most striking features of these groups is their commitment to live a 
common life, such that goods and meals are shared, and prayers recited together with regularity and for-
mality. 
 
 Some of the men within Consecrated life may also receive the sacrament of Holy Orders, and for 
this reason, it is not uncommon to know deacons, priests, and bishops (members of the ecclesiastical hier-
archy) who are also Religious.  Moreover, some of the tasks undertaken by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, such 
as spiritual counselling, distributing Holy Communion, visiting the sick, working in departments of the Ro-
man Curia, are shared with Religious, be they men or women. 
 
 Consecrated life distinguishes itself from other ecclesiastical institutions on the basis of its form of 
life, as described above, and the ends to which this form is directed.  The first end is evangelical: to model 
concretely the life of Jesus, who was poor, obedient, and chaste, and by this means to remind the Church 
that the way of life taught by Jesus is a paradigm for yesterday, today, and forever (cf. Heb.13, 8).  The sec-
ond, following from the first, is eschatological: Religious are meant to be signs or pointers of the Kingdom 
of Heaven, toward which everyone is destined. 
 
 My purpose in the following pages will be to address the problem of vocational fragility in Conse-
crated life, particularly in the early stages of commitment.  I am writing from the standpoint of one who is 
well acquainted with Religious Orders, with the contemporary issues facing Consecrated life, and with the 
conviction that Consecrated life is an indispensable facet of the Church‘s life.  I am equally convinced of 
the role and importance of institutions in perfecting masters and training novices in the tradition of a com-
munity.  The concern I wish to bring to the table, in light of these convictions, is the increased fragility of 
Consecrated life relative to the rapid expansion and steadfast commitment for which it was known only a 
few decades ago.        
 
 Fragility literally describes something as breakable and implies need of special care.  In recent times, 
predominantly in the modern West, the term has been used by spiritual directors and seminary personnel 
to characterize lifelong commitments (e.g., marriage, priesthood, Consecrated life) which have been 
marked by high levels of indecision and impermanence.  More specifically, fragility has been presupposed 
of a large number of young Religious who leave their Orders, or in cases which, while not resulting in de-
fections, seem troubled by uncertainty or straddled between different options.   
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 In identifying the causes of fragility, three accounts have come to dominate: theological, psycho-
logical, and sociological. These accounts have proffered a scientific way of calibrating the problem with re-
course to hard data: gesturing at various kinds of spiritual negligence, psychological limitations, and shifting 
social trends.  And these data often have been used to buttress certain critiques of modern Western society, 
such as those which claim that today‘s young people are sloughing off responsibility, obligations, and com-
mitments once held sacred.  But while the tune of these critiques is by now familiar (perhaps not entirely 
without justification), it would be a mistake to think that they, or the hard facts, tell the whole story of fra-
gility.  The problem with recurring to scientific accounts alone – that is, in viewing fragility from the stand-
point of the spectator looking upon the world – is that the picture of today‘s vocations risks being totalized 
and depersonalized.  The human person is sacrificed to the ―they‖ who are critiqued, and the individual is 
evacuated of anything remarkable or ―traumatizing‖ that would make him or her also the object of admira-
tion, the breath (spiritus) of new life in the institution.1 
 
The point I want to argue is that there is an unarticulated background at work with what some peo-
ple are calling fragility, and that the picture changes when the background is brought to the fore.  The pic-
ture (not of fragility!) puts us in view of the humanity of the other and provides us with a basis for ethically 
underpinning social interaction within and administration of ecclesiastical institutions.  As long as this 
background remains unarticulated, the story of fragility results as incomplete and what we say and do about 
it risks being misconstrued. 
 
In order to bring this background into view, I will draw from Charles Taylor‘s work of retrieval in 
Sources of the Self and The Malaise of Modernity through which the importance accorded to questions of iden-
tity or selfhood are seen in connection to a set of moral requirements which arise from the standard of be-
ing true to oneself: i.e., from the ethic of authenticity.2  Taken from this angle, a background should emerge 
for understanding fragility as a tension arising between the moral ideal of what it means to be true to one-
self, on one hand, and the requirements incumbent on an institution (e.g., Religious Orders, the Church, 
marriage and family) for discharging its proper functions in society, on the other.  By way of conclusion, I 
hope to offer some lines of thought concerning the conditions necessary for mediating these competing 
areas of interest and investment, and thus suggest a logic for strengthening the viability of vocational com-
mitment as a personal response to an ideal given by Christ, lived in community, under the inspiration of 
the Holy Spirit.   
 
 The synoptic Gospels offer an obvious starting point for framing vocational fragility.3 In the story 
of Christ‘s meeting with the young man, when the answer to the question: ―What must I do to merit eter-
nal life?‖ results in Christ‘s instruction: ―go, sell everything you have, and give to the poor … ; and come, 
follow me,‖ we learn that the man goes away sad and heavy of heart; for he was rich and could not bring 
himself to part with everything he owned (Mk 10:17-22, Mt 19:16-22, Lk. 18:18-23).4  We hear of others 
who wish to follow Jesus, but who seek at the same time to maintain the standards of everyday comfort, or 
to fulfill cultural obligations, or to maintain familial ties.  The cost of discipleship, in Christ‘s own words, is 
unequivocal:  ―No one who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God‖ (Lk. 
9:57-62).  Indeed, leaving behind one‘s treasure in order to follow Christ – be it houses or brothers or sis-
ters or father or mother or children or lands (Matt. 19:29) – seems to be the standard test of discipleship.  
And the standard response of the disciples whose faith it put to the test tends to be tepid and timorous – 
as we find with Peter‘s denial (Matt. 26:69-75, Mk. 14:66-72, Lk. 22:56-62, Jn. 18:25-27), the disciples‘ in-
ability to keep watch in the Garden of Gethsemane (Matt. 26:40, Mk. 14:37-41, Lk. 22:45-46), and Thomas‘ 
notorious doubt (Jn. 20:27). 
2
Vocations-A Publication of the Center for Vocation & Servant Leadership, Vol. 1 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.shu.edu/vocations/vol1/iss1/2
 18 
 While Sacred Scripture warns that the divine calling to discipleship may be submitted to verifica-
tion – ―as gold that is tested by fire‖ (4Exra.16; cf Sir. 2) – and while pusillanimity and humiliation are 
often more the outcome than courage and heroism, the lesson which has repeated itself through the ages 
– to the ancient Israelites and then to the disciples of Jesus – has been unequivocally to trust in God‘s 
mercy, to derive strength from one‘s trials, to hope beyond hope that all might be redeemed and remade 
according to God‘s plan of salvation.  (This puts me in mind of a vision of Julian of Norwich in which 
the Lord says:  ―‗Sin is needful, but all shall be well. And all shall be well. And all manner of thing shall 
be well‘...‖)5  Doubt, fear, faltering, even sin do not offer a sufficient basis for abandoning the call of dis-
cipleship. Rather, the urgency of evangelization, the kerygma itself, demands that efforts be made to shore 
up commitment and resolve.   
 
 With this lesson in mind, a strict correlation could not be made between the temptation to look 
over one‘s shoulder in longing for the life one has left behind and actually lacking the requisite aptitude 
for Consecrated life.  This is certainly the perspective taken on defections in Religiosorum Institutio (1961);6  
however, in the historical context in which this document was drafted, the matter of imputing moral cul-
pability for defections on major superiors and formation personnel was of far greater interest than exam-
ining more deeply the possible causes.7 Defections were seen plainly as a matter of spiritual negligence: 
either there was no vocation to begin with, or if there had been, someone was to be held accountable for 
its floundering.8 On this account, recurring causally to fragility might have seemed a ruse of moral lassi-
tude, or an incomprehensible trivialization of the indispensable process of verification which allowed that 
some people would justifiably leave, whether by their own reckoning or by proactive instruction of their 
superiors. 
  
 The possibility of interpreting one‘s vocational crisis otherwise, say through the lens of fragility, 
required that social and human conditions be taken into account in such a way as was only prepared for 
by The Second Vatican Council and particularly by Gaudium et Spes (1965).  With Gaudium et Spes the fact 
was fully acknowledged that the conditions for Religious belief and practice no longer obtained as before.  
After years of entrenchment against modernism (marked by interdicts, censorship, and excommunica-
tions),9 the Church turned a sympathetic regard on the ―troubled and perplexed‖ condition of the mod-
ern world and adopted a stance of ―solidarity and respectful affection for the whole human family.‖10  
With the Gospel in hand, the Church invited itself to become a partner in dialogue with humanity about 
all the different problems and questions concerning ―current trends in the world, about [man‘s] place and 
[…] role in the universe, about the meaning of individual and collective endeavour, and finally about the 
destiny and nature of man.‖11 On this account, it made sense to talk about fragility as a matter of concern 
not only in relation to Consecrated life and priesthood, but in relation to the value of the human person, 
the sanctity of marriage, the role and importance of the family, indeed, of the Christian calling itself.      
 
 In light of the Church having achieved this compassionate regard en face of the modern predica-
ment, subsequent endeavours to adapt Consecrated life, initiated under the decree Perfectae Caritatis 
(1965), ―in accordance with the needs of our age …, animated by a renewal of spirit,‖ soon came to re-
gard the problem of defections differently:  modern social and psychological circumstances were brought 
to bear on the exigencies of Religious life, and the force of seeing the problem of defections through the 
lens of Religiosorum Institutio – solely as one of moral negligence and irresponsibility (on whatever side this 
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 By contrast, Renovationis Causam (1969), in harmony with the compassion of Gaudium et Spes, rec-
ognized that ―[t]he youth of today who are called by God to the Religious state are not less desirous than 
before, rather they ardently desire to live up to this vocation in all its requirements, provided these be 
certain and authentic.‖12 So, if the burgeoning vocation crisis was to be addressed with any greater preci-
sion it would be in terms of appreciating fragility as a bi-product of new social pressures.  But it was not 
just that the cultural revolution of the 1960s – sex, drugs, and rock and roll – made it more difficult to 
cultivate and care for vocations (even after vows!), but that, at the level of freedom and responsibility, a 
proper grounding was lacking for youth to face these pressures with equilibrium.  Renovationis Causam 
framed the problem in terms of maturity: ―Most of the difficulties encountered today in the formation of 
novices are usually due to the fact that when they were admitted they did not have the required matur-
ity.‖13   On this account, instead of turning vocations away, the entire formation cycle was to be adapted 
to the ―mentality of younger generations and modern living conditions,‖ facilitating the attainment of 
human and spiritual maturity in stages.14  This did not necessarily demand that ―the candidate be … able 
to measure up immediately to all the demands of the Religious and apostolic life of the Institute‖; but 
there had to be a sufficient basis for expecting that the demands of Religious life could be taken up even-
tually after some initial guidance with serenity.15 
 
 Restructuring initial formation to provide personal guidance meant thinking in terms of catego-
ries such as Christian Formation (meeting Jesus of the Gospel), Social Adjustment (preparation for the 
vows and community life), and Development of Human Values (addressing the human and emotional 
maturity of the candidate).16 The specialized nature of these tasks, particularly the third (concerning psy-
chological maturity), could not be met entirely in-house by formation personnel, or naively presumed of 
the community, or seen as contingent on the agreeability of the environment and its distance from 
―metropolitan temptations‖—the avoidance of which had been the motivation for situating novitiates in 
the countryside.  Thus, the human psychological sciences were sought more regularly and with less preju-
dice—at least officially.17 
 
 Today, most if not all Religious orders and dioceses state in their official formation guidelines 
that psychological resources, where necessary and deemed helpful, be drawn upon to assist with the 
needs of formation, be this in the initial stages or afterward.  The degree to which this leads to an apti-
tude for Religious life varies from case to case.  And thus, some people may be deemed unsuited on a 
psychological basis.  In order to facilitate assessments at this level, a number of Orders, with the help of 
psychologists, have developed a checklist of positive and negative criteria or counter-indications, which, being 
adapted to the requirements of different apostolates, identify situations and attitudes which raise ques-
tions or doubts regarding vocational suitability or exclude the possibility of Consecrated life.18 
 
 But the assessment of the candidate‘s affective and emotional maturity presupposes an immanent 
framework of intricate psychological influences, such as family relations or exposure to violence and sex 
or the circumstances of childhood rearing.  On this account, the constitutive background of one‘s per-
sonal history determines where the question of adaptability to Consecrated life may be problematic, and 
can be weighed with a view to anticipating the likelihood of psychological integration and the chances of 
success . 
 
 And yet, a condition of fragility persists. This is known statistically.19 It is known also from re-
ports given by the major superiors of Religious Orders.20 Indeed, the very fact that the term fragility (or 
its equivalents has entered common reflection on the pastoral care of vocations, gestures at its validity 
also prior to statistical research: fragility captures what spiritual directors, seminary rectors, and novice 
masters have commonly come to regard as characterizing the condition of a new generation of young 
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Religious. The worry expressed here is not over the small percentage of Religious who leave on account 
of having verified through experience that their vocations genuinely lie elsewhere.  This has always hap-
pened.  The cases crying out for an account are of another type: those in which the conflicted discern-
ment of the young person shows up as an anomaly against the positive signs of a vocation.  This is what 
formation personnel have been trying to explain by recurring to an immanent psychological background; 
and that is why one response to the anomaly of enduring fragility has been to tighten the screws on the 
initial assessment.  The puzzle is that while the maturity of the Religious may be consistent with the re-
quirements of Religious life, and the positive signs of a vocation be amply present, a state of fragility still 
characterizes the vocation.  Why?  Moreover, there is a limit to how far any assessment can be taken in 
the first instance (be it psychological, spiritual, physical, or otherwise) before it becomes virtually impos-
sible for anyone to enter a Religious Order – and everyone recognizes this.  
 
  In order to find a way of completing or mediating the psychological picture of fragility, some 
have looked for its roots in the dominant social and cultural ideologies of our time.  An early articulation 
of this attempt can be found in Gaudium et Spes, where the predicament of human beings in the modern 
world (viz., at grips with questions of identity, the meaning of suffering and evil, the nature and destiny 
of man, the purpose of human existence) is understood in light of the speed of progress, patterns of con-
sumption, the abandonment of older lifestyles, etc.21   In other words, the conditions which obtain for 
Religious belief and practice (including the sources of atheism and secularism) are explained in relation to 
exogenous factors which shape mentalities, moral attitudes, and self-understanding.  On this account, 
fragility is no longer understood only in terms of one‘s immanent psychological background, such as one‘s 
troubled family background.  Rather, the breakdown of the family is on the same level as vocational fra-
gility; and the sources of both can be understood in terms of social change.  The social sciences have be-
come pivotal to how Religious Orders frame fragility and in what they see themselves as being able to do 
about it.          
 
 In a recent letter on vocational fragility, Rev. Francesco Cereda, SDB, General Councillor for 
Formation of the Salesians of Don Bosco,22  frames fragility according to a familiar characterization of 
social change which he labels postmodernity: The dominant individualist, consumerist, relativist culture of 
today – marked by constant transition and rapid change, eradicated from tradition, lacking a common 
moral grounding, and enjoying the security of affluence – has had a concomitant effect on clear thinking, 
self-giving, Religious faith, the acceptance of responsibility, and, ultimately, vocational perseverance.23  
The problem of vocational fragility (or the breakdown of the family), finds its roots in a state of affairs 
where people, especially young people, ―live in a way that is disjointed or conditioned by what is in fash-
ion; this weakens them and leads to even more inconsistency, incoherence, dissatisfaction, instability, su-
perficiality.24  This position is strengthened all the more when held against other contemporary societies 
(e.g., Africa, India, and Islamic societies), on one hand; and an earlier, more exigent age (e.g., the era be-
fore World War II), on the other.25 
 
 Now the tune of Cereda‘s concern, audible in other quarters of the Church, is by no means the 
lament of a Catholic outlook alone. Allan Bloom‘s Closing of the American Mind sounds the same alarm.26 
The crux of the argument assumes that today‘s youth are under the spell of a facile relativism – rooted in a 
kind of individualism – which amounts to: (i) the right to chose for themselves their own pattern of life; 
(ii) the right to decide in conscience what convictions to hold; (iii) the right to determine the shape of 
their lives in a whole host of ways that their ancestors could not control.27 A culture defined along these 
lines is worrisome to Cerea and Bloom (and many others besides28) for fear that individualism (self-
centeredness and the lack of shared values) will keep young people from ―an awareness of greater issues 
which transcend the self:‖ and that this will result in dire consequences for institutions.29 Even where 
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exception to this rule is taken by the generosity of many young people who invest themselves in peace-
and-development projects (e.g., The World Youth Alliance, Doctors Without Borders, and L’Arche), or 
who participate in enthusiastic spiritual movements (e.g., World Youth Day, Communion and Liberation, 
Campus Crusade for Christ); or who follow exigent spiritual paths (e.g., Opus Dei, Regnum Christi, the Tri-
dentine Liturgy), the force of the argument suggests that ―there is no moral ideal at work here, or if there 
is, on the surface, it is a screen for self-indulgence.”30  As Cereda puts it in reference to the present gen-
eration of young Catholics: in their search for novelty, marked by emotions such as ―I feel‖ and ―I 
want,‖ it follows that  
 
Religious experience … becomes the search for the feel-good factor about oneself and for highly emotional 
experiences.  In general Religious formation makes little impact and does not involve the person in the 
depth of his being.  Each one remains self-centred, convinced that everything can be easily achieved on 
the basis of personal prestige and possessions, and not with effort and perseverance. Then, as a result of 
ethical relativism, shared values do not exist. 
 
This has a knock-on effect on civil, ecclesiastical and Religious institutions, which, in addition to being 
weak and not very attractive because of changed times, are no longer popular nor appreciated, not trusted 
nor referred to.31 
 
With all that might be said about the rise of new Religious Orders and the fervour of Lay Movements, on 
one hand, there is the worsening problem of ongoing discernment and unsustained commitment, on the 
other.  Thus, it is not inconceivable that Cereda‘s harsh critique of modern Religious experience captures 
some – even much – of what may be going on.  It also seems that his social-scientific version of post 
modernity does not take into account its moral sources; and for this reason Cereda‘s story is unable to 
posit an outcome other than the slide to subjectivism and atomism it criticizes.  But I want to argue that 
the slide is not ineluctable; that there is an alternative.  A consideration of the sources of post modernity 
reveals that there is a background picture, a moral ideal, so far unveiled, which motivates young people 
to take up the exigent paths of Religious life and experience that they do.32  Subjectivism and atomism 
are its debased forms; but the moral ideal itself is precisely what needs to be taken into account if (a) we 
are to have a fuller appreciation of vocational fragility, and if (b) we are to consider the future and viabil-
ity of Religious institutions in light of that to which the ideal enables them to aspire. 
 
 What is the basis for invoking a moral ideal at this point?  In other words, in what sense is a 
moral ideal unaccounted for in the story of fragility given above according to Sacred Scripture, or the 
human and social sciences?  To some extent, the occurrence of a background prior to and informing 
one‘s choice and action is already presupposed in the other accounts.   This background is explained in 
terms of supposedly harder facts.  As we saw above, these are: (a) showing recalcitrance before the Di-
vine Calling, (b) shouldering the burden of psychological baggage, and (c) being driven ineluctably by 
social forces.  And, of course, where the opposite holds, the basis for the positive criteria emerges: (i) 
docility before the Divine Calling, (ii) psychological maturity, and (iii) immunity from the tainting effects 
of post modernity.  Now, none of these is to be excluded from a full account of fragility, nor should any 
one operate in an exclusionary way without the possibility of overlap.  But even so, these accounts do 
not explain how a vocation can find itself struggling to maintain higher ground over another calling, a 
good, demanding recognition – the demands of which are felt on the same level as those of the vocation. 
 
 To be sure, the conflict experienced between two perceived goods is as old as the fall from inno-
cence itself. What is new today is that people no longer approach this tension with the worry of divine 
retribution, or any other category through which it would be considered better to err in fidelity to the   
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vocational commitment than to err in pursuit of some other possibility or goal that is in some sense au-
thenticating.  What is new today is that the decision comes to be based on an inner sense of what it is 
more right to do, i.e., in terms of what one feels called to do.  This holds true for other vocations as well.  
Taylor observes: ―it is not just that people sacrifice their love relationships, and the care of their children, 
to pursue careers.  Something like this has always existed.  The point is that today people feel called to do 
this, feel they ought to do this, feel their lives would be somehow wasted or unfulfilled if they don‘t do 
it.‖33 
 
 When Taylor considers the sense of calling behind these choices, he uncovers a moral ideal.  By 
moral ideal he is underscoring the standard by which people evaluate what is better or higher, and pre-
suppose what is more desirable.  This ideal is the ethic of authenticity: referring to decisions which are 
based on some sense of what it means to be true to oneself.  Authenticity is what is being invoked when 
we say we are called to follow certain paths.  At the same time, many examples of abandoned commit-
ments today are representative of a debased form of this ideal.  But it need not be the case that individu-
alism in its strivings for authenticity narrow its capacity to think beyond itself.34 
  
 In other words, I want to suggest that the slide into atomism is not the only way the importance 
we place on the individual has to end; that authenticity is the valid form of this consideration; and that it 
should be taken seriously because it makes a difference to vocations and to the viability of institutions.   
 
 In order to make this point, it is important to appreciate how today our decisions and actions 
have come to rest on the axis of choice, and that for our pre modern ancestors this was not so.  Our pre-
modern ancestors had little say in how their vocations were decided.  One was either born into one‘s sta-
tion (knight, labourer, nobleman, etc.), or otherwise one was given by one‘s parents to a monastery in 
exchange for a divine favour, or sometimes one was inducted into clerical life to be schooled.  The ex-
ceptional cases in which one did break from the pre-established order in order to follow a Divine Calling 
was not tantamount to challenging that order; nor would it have been entirely comprehensible in our 
modern sense of acting from personal conviction.  By way of example, St. Francis of Assisi divested him-
self of his aristocratic heritage (quite literally) in order to don the garb of poverty not from a gradually 
acquired sense of what was more meaningful for him; rather, his action was a matter of conversion 
(metanoia), falling quite suddenly on the heels of Christ speaking to him from the crucifix in San 
Damiano.  The Divine Calling for St. Francis was not the result of an unarticulated inner sense of what 
obtained for deciding and acting (which is what we invoke in vocational discernment today); it was a 
command he received from Christ.    
 
 To the extent that it is not entirely disconcerting for us to think of a vocation as a matter of obe-
dience to a God-given command, it is in fact still possible to use this phraseology even today.  Kierke-
gaard, a man less modern than ourselves, still shuddered at the thought of it in Fear and Trembling, and 
could not fathom its possibility without first eulogizing the dreaded drama of Abraham offering his son 
Isaac on Mount Moriah.  Similarly, we today are a long way off from Anselm‘s credo quia absurdum est on 
matters of vocational discernment.  There is a crucial difference which has to be appreciated if our mod-
ern culture of discernment is to be seen in its connection with vocational fragility; or if that which ap-
pears to be the lack of resolve or the fear of self-denial in today‘s young people is to lead to framing the 
challenges facing Religious life with greater clarity.  The resoluteness of our premodern ancestors, de-
scribed above, arises before ―the growth of a rich vocabulary of interiority, an inner realm of thought and 
feeling to be explored. This frontier of self-exploration has grown through various spiritual disciplines of 
self examination, through Montaigne, the development of the modern novel, the rise of Romanticism, 
the ethic of authenticity, to the point where now we conceive of ourselves as having inner depths. We 
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might even say that the depths that were previously located in the cosmos, the enchanted world, are now 
more radically placed within.‖35  This appeal to inner depths carries us out of the world where what ob-
tains spiritually derives from ―purposive forces already in nature,‖ into a context that ―puts a premium 
on constructive action, on an instrumental stance towards the world.‖36   The emphasis in Christianity, 
then, begins to crystallize around ordinary life – the life of production and reproduction, work and love. 
Ordinary life inculcates new disciplines which, in the context of the present discussion, are seen in a vari-
ety new ecclesial movements which bring together laity and Religious, families and celibates, men and 
women, contemplatives and actives under one roof to live the Gospel in some manner of shared experi-
ence, with accents on family spirit, spiritual friendship, and social outreach.  The thought of the monastic 
ideal becoming incarnate in ordinary life, as a leaven of Christian hope and love, holds remarkable appeal 
for young people today.37  It brings one to posit the wild analogy of St. Benedict in Greenwich Village.   
 
  How does all this change the story of fragility?   It places a great deal of importance – from the 
very first moment of discernment – on a personal sense of fulfilment.  This ideal survives today as the 
legacy of a certain Romantic expressivism in which moral importance was accorded to the idea that each 
person was the artist of his or her own life.  Today the ideal comes to us in the ethic of authenticity and 
takes the following formulation: ―Being true to myself means being true to my own originality, and that is 
something only I can articulate and discover.  In articulating it, I am also defining myself.  I am realizing 
a potentiality that is properly my own.‖38   Expressivism today means listening to one‘s inner depths in 
order (a) to recover what corresponds in thought and action to one‘s personal sense of self, and (b) to 
bring this into some kind of embodiment, to externalize it for all others to see and recognize.  We do not 
need to recur to Walt Whitman in order to find this ethic at work.  To a great extent, in the popular 
imagination, it has been attributed anachronistically to St. Francis of Assisi (although we are now in a 
better position to see the limits of this reading, as well as to anticipate the debased forms and fragmenta-
tion into which this ethic can slide).  Every ideal has its debased forms; but there is no sense in which 
fear of these dangers should preemptively exclude expressivism from modern embodiments of Catholic 
Christianity.  It is a powerful ideal in the spirituality of young people today on which even Pope John 
Paul II draws when considering the pastoral care of vocations:  
 
 This is what is needed: a Church for young people, which will know how to speak to their heart and en
 kindle, comfort, and inspire enthusiasm in it with the joy of the Gospel and the strength of the Eucharist; 
 a Church which will know how to invite and to welcome the person who seeks a purpose for which to 
 commit his whole existence; a Church which is not afraid to require much, after having given much; 
 which does not fear asking from young people the effort of a noble and authentic adventure, such as that  
 of the following of the Gospel.39 
 
Expressivism and the accent on ordinary life have become part of the way modern Catholic Christianity 
represents itself to itself, both in lay movements and in a variety of new embodiments of Consecrated 
life.   Even more striking is the fact that a whole slew of recently canonized saints captivate the imagina-
tion not only for their virtue and miracles, but for the ordinariness of their lives (e.g., think of Pier Gior-
gio Frassati‘s alpine skiing or Mother Teresa‘s temptations to atheism).     
 
 Thus, authenticity is a moral ethic with a definite consequence on vocational discernment and on 
modern Religious belief and practice.  To this end, Taylor is perhaps right: ―What we need is neither root
-and-branch condemnation nor uncritical praise; and not a carefully balanced trade-off.  What we need is 
a work of retrieval, through which this ideal can help restore our practice.”40  I have felt the better part of 
this retrieval in the more capable hands of Professor Taylor. What I have tried to suggest is that the re-
trieval in question anticipates a logic by which to safeguard the role and importance of institutions, 
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on one hand, and the means by which the ethic of authenticity can take shape, as an animating principle 
without fragmentizing community or the mission, on the other. 
 
 The role and importance of Religious Orders is to help accomplish the work of salvation in the 
world.41 This goal depends on the flourishing of its members.  In the past, when tension arose between 
the individual and the institution, it was wondered whether this flourishing was best achieved by heavy 
handed governance or by unrestrained freedom.  Neither of these has proven to be helpful as a viable 
logic for flourishing.  It seems a third possibility has yet to be explored where both governance and free-
dom abide as co-principles, but where the limit of either one or the other requires a mediator.  Here 
there is need of further philosophical enquiry.  The sources of Consecrated life recovered at the Second 
Vatican Council can only realize their potential within the culture of authenticity if there is (1) a recovery 
in ethics of a shared moral sense of the good, a common object of love, in relation to which members of 
a community recognize themselves and generate self-understanding, and (2) a willingness to consider 
what it means to place oneself in ethical relation to the other person in light of this love-generating ob-
ject before pressing forward with pragmatic exigencies – even when these exigencies are tied to the ur-
gencies of  evangelization.42  On the theological plane, a constellation of questions and challenges arise 
from these two points concerning how to organize the relationship between the institutional Church and 
the charismatic element within the Church, which will likely keep theologians occupied for years to 
come. 
 
  Still, some guiding principles are already within view.  In an article on the relationship between 
―institution‖ and ―Spirit‖ (i.e., the hierarchical and the pneumatological elements in the Church), Josef 
Ratzinger (Benedict XVI) cautioned against too great an emphasis on pastoral planning and organization 
en face of the renewal of the Church represented in ecclesial movements and new orders.  Ratzinger‘s cau-
tion in fact mirrors my own apprehension about shaping religious orders around exigencies rather than 
the gifts of the Spirit embodied in the men and women who are the life by which they live.  The point I 
wish to underscore from Ratzinger‘s article is the dual importance of an individual‘s participating in the 
forms of life of a community, on one hand, and the community‘s remaining opened to new forms of life 
proposed by the Spirit, on the other.  Ratzinger‘s words, quoted below, are directed to the movements; 
but they can easily be extended to new orders, and, on my view, to young members of religious orders 
and their superiors.  He writes: ―While it is necessary to remind the movements that – even though they 
have found and pass on the whole of the faith in their own way – they are a gift to and in the whole of 
the Church and must submit themselves to the demands of this totality in order to be true to their own 
essence.  But the local churches, too, even the bishops, must be reminded to avoid making an ideal of uniformity in pas-
toral organization and planning.  They must not make their own pastoral plans the criterion of what the Holy Spirit is 
allowed to do:  an obsession with planning could render the churches impermeable to the Spirit of God, to the power by 
which they live.”43 
 
 As it is evident from Ratzinger‘s caution that there is need of further theological work in the 
moral shaping of the Christian community. Perhaps this can be profitably accessed anew by turning to 
friendship—a long neglected theme of theology;44 for friendship, a central principle of Christianity – re-
flected in the Trinity, the Communion of the Saints, the history of the early Church, and in the intrinsic 
structure of being, namely, reciprocity – is equally crucial to the ethic of authenticity. In Taylor‘s words, 
―in the culture of authenticity, relationships are seen as the key loci of self-discovery and self-
confirmation. Love relationships are not important just because of the general emphasis in modern cul-
ture on the fulfillment of ordinary life. They are also crucial because they are the crucibles of inwardly 
generated identity.‖45 Some of what Taylor is gesturing at, is already acknowledged in the renewed 
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emphasis on community life expounded with exemplary eloquence in Fraternal Life in Community and 
Vita Consacrata.46 With friendship ethically underpinning human relations – be it by fostering relations of 
the heart (cf. St. Augustine, J. H. Newman), or by ‗seeking the face of the other‘ (cf. Levinas) – one is 
well removed from the standpoint of the spectator looking upon the world; one is much better posi-
tioned to recognize through the particularity and incommunicable depths of the other person the Spirit 
moving through and renewing – not sacrificing – institutions. 
 
 In the future, perhaps the dreams, hopes, and desires of young Religious and the personal gifts 
with which the Holy Spirit has endowed them, on one hand, and the role and importance of the institu-
tions and the structures of authority, on the other, may be seen less in tension, and more as overlapping.  
Weighed down by the pragmatic exigencies of older structures and the dwindling number of Religious 
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